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ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
ARBITRATION has with the aid of legislation' developed from an improvised
and misunderstood technique into an effective method for settling disputes.
Although the Federal Government has, as lawmaker, facilitated the use of
arbitration and arbitration agreements by private parties, 2 it has so far denied
itself the benefits of the device with respect to its own contracts. The current
expansion of public spending for defense, multiplying the Government's con-
tractual relations with private business,2 emphasizes this defect in the pro-
cedure of federal procurement. It is the purpose of this Comment to discover
whether or not the Government is denied the use of arbitration under existing
law, and if so, to consider the problems which must be met before arbitration
can be made available. This inquiry will be made with a view to recom-
mending the legislative authorization that may seem necessary.
L
An arbitration agreement is an agreement to submit an existing or future
controversy to a non-judicial tribunal chosen by the parties. The advantage
of arbitration lies mainly in the flexibility which it provides in the adjust-
ment of disputes typically arising under contracts for sale or construction.
4
Few public or private contracts present novel or subtle issues of law requiring
judicial interpretation. Few contracting parties, on the other hand, can escape
disagreement, more or less serious, over questions of the quantity and quality
of materials used or sold, elements of cost in cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts,
or the allocation of liability for delays in performance. When such disputes
arise, litigation is often costly and dilatory. Arbitration refers them to a body
familiar with the practices and language of the trade, ready to proceed to
hearing promptly, and able to investigate the merits of a controversy without
1. While every state except Oklahoma and South Dakota has enacted general
statutes governing arbitration of existing controversies, the movement to provide statu-
tory sanctions for agreements to arbitrate future disputes began with the enactment of
the New York Arbitration Law in 1920. Statutes similar to that of New York have
been enacted in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Hawaii, and the United
States. A Uniform Arbitration Act, which does not cover future disputes agreements,
has been enacted in Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming.
2. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1939), hereinafter referred to
as ARBITRATION AcT.
3. In December, 1940, it was estimated that 30% of the plants in the United States
capable of manufacturing goods for the national defense program were working on Gov-
ernment contracts. Statement of Philip Murray in N. Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1940, p. 1,
col. 1. See Comment (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 250, 266-285.
4. See Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Commonj Law
Rules of Marketing (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 480.
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tripping over the more restrictive rules of evidence and civil procedure.,
Involuntary delays do not appear because ad hoc arbitral tribunals never
have crowded dockets,G and dilatory tactics are minimized. Moreover, if court
action is necessary to enforce any phase of the arbitration procedure, it can
be quickly secured, since statutory arbitration agreements are enforced, and
awards confirmed, vacated, or corrected, under simplified motion procedure.7
These advantages have been widely recognized by legal and commercial
groups, which have urged the passage of statutes designed to remove the
common law limitations on arbitration agreements and arbitral proceedings
and awards,8 and have encouraged or compelled arbitration of disputes
arising among their own members.9 In England, where statutory arbitration
has a longer history,' 0 it has been estimated that less than 3% of the disputes
over commercial contracts are settled by litigation."1
When disputes arise under Government contracts, however, both the Gov-
ernment and the contractor are at present limited to procedures which in
5. Although generalizations are difficult because of the varying standards for arbi-
tration proceedings applied by courts in reviewing awards, the proposition that arbi-
trators are not obliged to follow common law rules of evidence is generally accepted.
See the discussion in Sturges, supra note 4, at 485.
6. During the last fiscal year reported on by the Attorney General, the Court of
Claims had 1,156 cases pending at the beginning of the year, docketed 769 cases, disposed
of 331, and had 1,594 pending at the close of the year. In the district courts, 65.3% of
civil cases in the same period had been pending six months or over, and 17.3% three
years or over. REP. Avr'Y GEN. (1939) 192.
7. AERBiRATiON Acr §§ 6, 12, 13; Cohen and Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 265.
8. At common law courts refused to stay suits brought in violation of arbitration
agreements. The doctrine that future disputes clauses are contracts void as attempts
to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction" is usually traced to Vynior's Case, decided by
Lord Coke in 1609, 8 Coke 80 (K. B. 1609). The language first appeared in Kill v.
Hollister, 1 Wilson 129 (K. B. 1746). See Sayre, Development of Commcrcial Arbi-
tration, Law (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 595. Specific performance of agreements to arbi-
trate was denied on the ground that there is no lack of equity in confining parties to
the courts. Kaufmann v. Liggett, 209 Pa. 87, 58 At. 129 (1904); Greason v. Keteltas,
17 N. Y. 491 (1858). And the award could not be reduced to judgment without suit
on the award, on a penal bond given to insure performance, or on a promissory note.
See STURGES, CommERciAL AmrraamrioNs AND Aw.uws (1930) 674. Parties may arbi-
trate under common law rules despite the existence of arbitration statutes, which are
regarded as merely cumulative. For discussion of the relation between common law and
statutory arbitrations, consult STURGES, op. cit. supra. The doctrine that the statutes
are remedial in character has created some confusion in the application of conflicts of
laws principles to arbitration agreements. See Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitratiol:--In-
ternational and Interstate Aspects (1934) 43 YA.E L. J. 716.
9. See Cohen and Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law (1926) 12 VA. L.
REv. 265; Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law (1928) 37 YA.n L. J.
595.
10. 52 & 53 Vicr., c. 49 (1889); 10 & 11 GE. V., c. 81 (1920).
11. Rosenbaum, A Report on Commercial Arbitration in England (1916), Bulletin
XII of the American Judicature Society; see BAcoN, CommumcrmL An3ITnATbo; AS Gov-
ERNED BY THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1925).
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private dealings would be regarded as cumbersome and unsatisfactory. The
standard forms for Government contracts and sub-contracts now attempt to
discourage litigation by including varying provisions designed to refer all
disputes over questions of fact to determination by a Government repre-
sentative, with a right of appeal to a designated superior official or officials.1"
Only if the specified officials fail or refuse to decide the facts, or use their
powers fraudulently, has the contractor an opportunity to secure an inde-
pendent examination of the controversy. Otherwise their decision binds
both parties.1 3 If delays are caused by the Government, the contractor must
submit written notice of the facts to the contracting officer to secure remis-
sion of the liquidated damages stipulated in the contract.14  He must sue
for his own damages, however, unless an appropriation is specially providedyr
The desirability of referring these disputes to arbitration seems clear.
It would of course reduce demands on the time of policy-forming officials
now constrained to hear or otherwise dispose of appeals. But the essential
fact is that an adjudication by arbitration would be more in keeping with
notions of fairness than any decision by an individual official. Such unilateral
determinations involve many of the issues which, under private contracts,
are decided by impartial bodies through litigation or arbitration. Entrusting
to a contracting officer the primary decision as to whether or not that officer
was responsible for delay in the performance of a contract, for instance, seems
an even less desirable method for settling disputes than litigation.10 Appeal
12. A typical clause is Article XV in the War Department's Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee
Construction Contract, approved by the Assistant Secretary of War on July 12, 1940.
It provides that all disputes concerning questions of fact shall be decided by the con-
tracting officer, subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the Chief
of Branch or his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and con-
elusive upon both parties when the amount involved is $15,000 or less. When a larger
amount is involved, the decision of the Chief of Branch can be appealed by the con-
tractor to the Secretary of War. In the meantime the contractor must "diligently pro-
ceed with the work as directed."
13. United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S. 588 (1900) (engineer's finding on length
of "just and reasonable" delay in performance) ; Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398
(1878) (distance under contract for transportation fixed by chief quartermaster) ; Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 633 (1923) (proper extension of time);
Brinck, Receiver v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 170 (1918) (quality of material).
14. McGUIRE, MATTERS OF PROCEDURE UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1935).
15. The Court of Claims is not, like the General Accounting Office, limited to exist-
ing appropriations. See MANSFI D, THE COmpTROLLER GENERAL (1939) 109. The Court
has, on the other hand, declined jurisdiction of claims which could be settled by the
Comptroller General. See In re Proposed Reference, 53 Ct. Cl. 370 (1918) ; In re De-
partmental Reference, 59 Ct." Cl. 813 (1924).
16. Objection has also been made that under the present system departmental deci-
sions may involve questions of law. The theory remains that it is "the province of the
courts to declare the law of the contract." Davis v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 334
(1936). In this case the Court of Claims held that decisions as to the meaning of the
words "wiring" and "subcontractor" were questions of law. Whether the work met
(Vol. 50: 458460
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through the hierarchy of the department to officials who know progressively
less about the precise matters at issue seems an illusory safeguard,1 7 as does
the contractor's opportunity to persuade a court that the initial determina-
tion was fraudulent. From the Government's point of view, the experience
of other public bodies which have tried arbitration suggests that, once the
sovereign has shed its immunity, it need have no more to fear from inde-
pendent arbiters than from an equally independent judiciary.",
Once accepted by the Government, arbitration can perform functions
broader than the adjustment of disputes under procurement contracts. Upon
the cessation of hostilities in 1918, the Government needed both to dispose
of surplus supplies on hand and to stop work on thousands of contracts with
manufacturers. Local sales control boards headed by Army officers were
set up by the War Department with broad powers to settle disputes arising
over sale of supplies at auction, even to the extent of ordering refundment
to purchasers where funds had not been covered into the Treasury.' Ade-
quate arbitration clauses in the sales contracts would presumably have assured
a more impartial and complete hearing of these controversies. In terminating
contracts, the Secretary of War offered his own settlements to contracturs
in lieu of the remedies provided by contract, or suit for breach of contract
in the Court of Claims.2 0 Such settlements, involving determination of the
contract requirements, and who was liable for delay in performance, were classified as
questions of "fact." The futility of such distinctions is apparent.
17. Cf. Bray v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 132 (1911); Fitzgibbon v. United States,
52 Ct. Cl. 164 (1917).
18. The Pennsylvania Arbitration Act is specifically made applicable to any written
contract executed by the state, any of its agencies or subdivisions, or any municipal
corporations. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 5, §§ 176, 181; Commonwealth v. Union
Paving Co., 288 Pa. 577, 136 Atl. 856 (1927). Compulsory arbitratiun of cuntruversies
arising from contracts of the state highway commission is provided by statute in North
Dakota and in Minnesota. MiNx. STAT. (1927) § 2554(17); N. D. Lws, 1927, c. 160.
Municipal corporations are generally stated to have an inherent power, incident to their
power to contract, to submit to arbitration. DiLLOV, MUNICIPAL COR FOUTIOS (4th
ed. 1890) §478; Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111. 563 (1877); District Twp. of Walnut
v. Rankin, 70 Iowa 65, 29 N. W. 806 (1886); Maroulas v. State Industrial Accident
Comm., 117 Ore. 406, 244 Pac. 317 (1926). Iowa has carried an arbitration provision in
its specifications for highway work for 25 years, under which some 40 arbitrations have
been held. The Port of New York Authority and the Department of Water Supply of
the City of Detroit have occasionally resorted to arbitration. The recent contract for
construction of the Lake Champlain Bridge, between Crown Point, New York, and Chim-
ney Point, Vermont, included a clause making the findings of the bridge commission's
engineer on questions of time and financial consideration reviewable by arbitration pur-
suant to the New York Act. White, Arbitration Under Public Construction Contracts
(1937) 1 Aimir. J. 149.
19. For a description of the boards, see United States v. Koplin, 24 F. (2d) 840
(N. D. Ga. 1928).
20. The legislation and procedure is described in ,%otes on Jurisdiction of the Sec-
retary of War to Settle Contracts and Usual Basis Used in Doing So. (U. S. War Dep't
1920).
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contractors' net expenditures under the terminated contracts,21 would also
have been given fuller and more impartial consideration by arbitrators. At
present, arbitration would permit decentralized and efficient determinations
of similar issues under contracts to construct emergency facilities for defense
production.
II.
Despite the policy expressed by Congress in the United States Arbitra-
tion Act, it has been said that Government contracting officers are powerless
to agree to arbitrate without express statutory authority. Because this opinion
rests in part on grounds other than specific lack of statutory authorization,
its foundations are worth investigating with some particularity.
The question was judicially considered on one occasion, in the case of
United States v. Ames,22 decided by the Circuit Court of Massachusetts in
1845. The Secretary of War had authorized the district attorney for Massa-
chusetts to refer to arbitration a controversy between Ames and the Govern-
ment over a dam erected by Ames which caused water to flow on Govern-
ment land. An arbitration was held and an award, in part favorable to
Ames, was rendered; but the then prevailing procedure for entering the
award as a rule of court was not followed. 23 Later the Government sued
Ames for trespass, and he pleaded the award. The precise issue was whether
or not the award constituted an adequate plea in bar. In ruling the plea
invalid, the court held that the Secretary's authorization to arbitrate was
beyond constitutional power, since no department or officer of the Govern-
ment may vest judicial power anywhere except in a court created tinder
Article 3 of the Constitution.2 4 The holding seems puzzling and inconclusive.
If it was meant that only constitutional courts can judicially determine the
Government's rights, the argument is no longer valid. The Court of Claims,
established and judicially sustained after the Ames case, 25 is a legislative
court exercising judicial power.26 Nevertheless, the Ames case is still cited
21. In eight months, the Secretary settled 21,800 contracts for an aggregate sum of
$272,786,000, an average of 13% of the contract price. Settlements were based on cost,
not on the contract price, and excluded compensation for anticipated profit. Although
contractors who refused to accept the settlement offered by the War Department could
sue for breach, the Department pointedly suggested that settlement was "much more
favorable than litigation of so great a number of claims against the United States would
be with the consequent delays, both in reaching judgments and in obtaining from Con-
gress the appropriations to pay the same." U. S. War Dep't, op. cit. supra note 20, at 16.
22. 24 Fed. Cas. 784 (C. C. Mass. 1845).
23. Id. at 789.
24. Ibid.
25. Act Feb. 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 STAT. 612; Act March 3, 1863, c. 92, 12 STAT. 765;
as incorporated in 36 STAT. 1135 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §250 (Supp. 1939). A concise
history of the Court may be found in Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United
States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447 (1932).
26. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 (1933).
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to support the proposition that the rights and liabilities of the United States
may not be submitted to the adjudication of arbitrators.
2
T
A second line of argument, adopted by the Judge Advocate General of
the Army, is that agreements to settle by arbitration all disputes arising
under a contract are void as attempts to "oust the jurisdiction" of the courts,2
and that a Government contracting officer cannot "waive the illegality" of
such a clause by inserting it in a contract.20 The basic assumption of this
argument, that arbitration clauses are against public policy, was superseded
by the United States Arbitration Act, which expressly declares against their
invalidity and makes them irrevocable and specifically enforceable. Though
this legislation may have limited application in some instances, as when
parties agree to submit future disputes to a tribunal in a foreign jurisdic-
tion,30 no special limitations apply to the use of arbitration agreements by
the United States.
The most stubborn opposition to proposals for arbitration by the United
States has appeared in the deliberations of the Comptroller General.31 More
precisely, that officer has ruled that the Government cannot be charged with
the expenses of an arbitration for which there has been no appropriation
by Congress.32 Reliance was had upon a 1909 statute-s prohibiting the use
of Treasury funds for the expenses of unauthorized boards and commis-
sions.34 The legal effect of his decision might be technically avoided by an
agreement which would charge the contractor with the expenses of the arbi-
tration. But the Comptroller General's strategic power over disbursements,
enhanced by the circumstance that they are imperfectly defined, has given
at least an in terrorem persuasiveness to his broader statements that agree-
ments to arbitrate would be invalid unless authorized by statute.35 The
27. 8 DEc. Comp. GEN. 96 (1928).
28. See note 8 supra.
29. Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General, 1912-30, 410 (May 5, 1919),
164 (Apr. 14, 1920). The Attorney General, in disapproving a contract giving a power
company an unlimited option to purchase a government plant and containing other clauses
unfavorable to the government, expressed his opinion that a provision for the "arbi-
tration" (i.e., appraisal) of the price to be paid w%-as unenforceable. 33 O's. Arr'- Gui;.
160 (Daugherty, 1922).
30. The Edam, 27 F. Supp. 8 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ("all disputes to be submitted to
the determination of the competent court at Rotterdam" held not an arbitration clause).
31. 8 Dzc. Com,'. GEN. 96 (1928); 7 DEc. Comp. G N. 541 (1928); 6 DEC. Coup.
GEN. 140 (1926); 5 DEc. Comp. GEN. 417 (1925).
32. See decisions cited supra note 31.
33. 35 STAT. 1027 (1909), 31 U. S. C. § 673 (Supp. 1939).
34. 43 Coxo. REc. 3118, 3119 (1909). Its sponsor complained of the "great num-
ber of commissions that are now in existence (that) have been working under author-
ity from the executive department alone." The measure was modified to substitute the
words "authorized by law" for "authorized by Congress." The statute also forbids the
detailing of regular government employes to unauthorized commissions.
35. For criticism of the Comptroller General's powers, see MANsFELD, Tim Coin-
TaoL.ER GENERAL- (1939) passim.
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Comptroller General has expressed this view in disapproving contracts con-
taining limited future disputes clauses which were submitted to him by the
Secretary of War30 and the Secretary of Commerce." He rejected the argu-
ment that the general authorization of the Secretary of Commerce to acquire
leases "under terms customary in the oil and gas industry" included power
to agree to arbitration of disputes over the value of gas rights and the cost
of drilling wells.
38
Although it would seem that none of these arguments conclusively estab-
lishes the necessity for statutory authorization to arbitrate, in practical effect
they have proved a formidable deterrent to experiment. Understandable
inhibitions have stood in the way of bringing the question to a court test.
If the contract is awarded by bid, the bidder may have little opportunity to
shape the terms of the bargain. Even if it is awarded by negotiation, 9 private
contractors and Government contracting officers are inclined to accede to
opinions held by Government legal or accounting departments. On the as-
sumption, therefore, that specific statutory authorization is desirable as a
practical matter if not as a legal necessity, it is proposed to discuss the prob-
lems such authorization may raise.
III.
Since Congress may provide for the adjustment of claims by 40 and
against 4' the Government and regulate the manner of their determination,
it may unquestionably authorize the adjustment of both classes of claims
by arbitration. The power of Congress to provide for the enforcement of
36. 7 DEc. ComP. GEN. 541 (1928). In this opinion the Comptroller General advised
the Secretary of War that a clause in a lease by the War Department of power generat-
ing facilities, providing for arbitration of disputes by three arbitrators, one to be chosen
by the War Department, one by the power company, and the third by tile two so desig-
nated, was not within the Secretary's authority.
37. 8 DEC. Comsp. GEN. 96 (1928).
38. The Ames case was cited to sustain his position. 8 DEc. CoMp. GEN. 96 (1928).
39. Permitted by certain recent appropriation measures. Pub. L. No. 781, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (Sept. 9, 1940); Pub. L. No. 667, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 26, 1940); Pub.
L. No. 671, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 28, 1940) § 2(a); Pub. L. No. 703, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (July 2, 1940) §§ 1(a), 1(b) 5; Pub. L. No. 588, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June
11, 1940).
40. Power to compromise unliquidated claims is exercised by the Attorney General,
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Rsv. STAT.
§3469 (1875), 31 U. S. C. §194 (Supp. 1939); 53 STAT. 508 (1939), 15 U. S. C. §728
(Supp. 1939); Executive Order No. 6166, June 10, 1933. The Attorney General pos-
sesses the general power of an attorney conducting a suit to dismiss, discontinue, or com-
promise government suits. See 38 Ops. Arr'v GEN. 125 (1934).
41. See note 25 supra. On claims up to $10,000, the district courts exercise juris-
diction concurrently with the Court of Claims. 36 STAT. 1093 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (20)
(Supp. 1939). The General Accounting Office has limited powers of settlement. 42 STAT.
24 (1921), 31 U. S. C. § 71 (Supp. 1939).
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claims by or against the Government in regulating the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is also clear.42 The form of statutory authorization for arbi-
tration presents, therefore, not problems of power, but problems of policy.
The first problem seems to be whether authority to arbitrate should be
conferred specially or generally. Special authorizations could be included
in the individual statutes creating each of the Government agencies, or in
particular appropriation measures.43 Congress would thus have to consider
separately each agency and department and any possible reasons peculiar
to it for avoiding, or limiting, resort to arbitration.44 The alternative is
a general authorization by amendment to the United States Arbitration Act
which would make its provisions available to Government contracting officers.
This method would seem to be far more expedient.
It seems desirable, if a general authorization is conferred, that contracting
officers be left to determine the extent to which they will employ arbitration,
both as to the type of contracts affected and as to the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreements. The authorization proposed is therefore permissive rather
than mandatory. While this vesting of discretion might enable administrative
standpatters to deny arbitration to contractors who would have no legal
standing to compel it, the disadvantages of discretion seem to be outweighed
by those which would attend a blanket Congressional order to arbitrate.
Such an order might well discredit the remedy by exposing to mandamus
proceedings 45 officers who had good reason to avoid arbitration in a par-
ticular case. And once the existing obstacles to arbitration had been removed,
administrative responsibility would be better served by allowing officers a
freedom of experiment and adaptation in discovering feasible uses and desir-
able limitations.
In leaving to contracting officers the definition of the scope of the agree-
ment, the proposed general authorization would permit them to include
42. See notes 25 and 41 supra.
43. The United States Shipping Board and any other government agency operating
a merchant vessel may "arbitrate, compromise, or settle" a libel in personam M r a suit
for salvage services rendered by the vessel. 41 STAT. 527 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 749
(Supp. 1939). The word "arbitrate" in this statute has not been judicially defined. The
criminal code contains a provision that any disputes as to the "price, quality, suitability
or character" of products manufactured in a prison industry for a Government depart-
ment shall be arbitrated by a board consisting of the Comptroller General of the United
States, the Superintendent of Supplies of the General Supply Committee, and the Chief
of the United States Bureau of Efficiency, or their representatives. 46 STAT. 392 (1930),
18 U. S. C. § 744(g) (Supp. 1939). The General Supply Committee was abolished by
Executive Order of June 10, 1933, No. 6166, § 1. The Bureau of Efficiency has ben
abolished by Congress. 47 SrAT. 1519 (1933).
44. Officials may prefer to reserve for litigation contracts involving very large sums,
feeling that the publicity that would be attracted by a large award adverse to the Guv-
eminent might expose them to criticism. See W\"hite, Arbitration Under Pulic Constru:-
tion Contracts (1937) 1 ARaiT. J. 149, 151.
45. Miguel v. 'McCarl, 291 U. S. 442 (1934); see note 75 infra.
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within it any matters which could be included in such an agreement between
private parties. 40 There should be no difficulty in defining the scope of an
existing controversy submitted to arbitration. 47 Courts have sometimes inter-
preted future disputes agreements liberally,48 however, and officers desiring
to limit their scope should do so with nicety. What exceptions are desirable,
and how completely arbitrators should displace courts and other agencies
in adjudicating public rights, are questions depending on general considera-
tions of policy and convenience. 49 Since the Government in its commercial
dealings is considered a ward of the court, 50 its officers might be protected
from the consequences of defective draftsmanship; but contractors would
not enjoy any such protection. Fairness suggests the desirability of drawing
on the many expert sources available 5' to aid in the drafting of suitable
standard forms for arbitration agreements, similar to those now in use for
other Government contracts.
52
No doubt of the individual agent's authority to arbitrate should exist when
a future disputes clause appears in a contract, if it is countersigned by a
superior officer. This is a usual requirement to prevent execution by agents
without actual authority. 53 An agreement attempted by parol would be
46. The United States Arbitration Act excludes from its scope "contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce." ARBITRATION ACT § 1.
47. This would be the case where disagreement arose over a contract not containing
a future disputes clause, and it were desired to submit the controversy to arbitration.
Under statutes prescribing separate formalities for future disputes clauses and agree-
ments to submit existing controversies, the argument may be made that submission agree-
ments must be executed for each dispute arising under a future disputes clause. The
United States Act, however, does not prescribe separate formalities. See STURMES, COM-
MERCIAL ARB TRATION AND AWARDS (1930)'324-328.
48. Connor v. Simpson, 104 Pa. 440 (1883); Clark & Sons v. Pittsburgh, 217 Pa.
46, 66 Atl. 154 (1907). But cf. Young v. Crescent Dev. Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E.
510 (1925); Smith Fireproof Const. Co. v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 247 N. Y. 277, 160
N. E. 369 (1928).
49. See note 44 supra.
50. Wilber Nat. Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 123 (1935); United States
v. Verdier, 164 U. S. 213 (1896). Justice Holmes' statement of the policy underlying
the doctrine is characteristic: "Men must turn square corners when they deal with the
government." Rock Island, A. & L. R. R. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143 (1920).
51. The American Arbitration Association, notably, has developed advisory facilities
for arbitrations. See Parker, Arbitration Under the Standard Documents of the Amer-
ican Institute of Architects (1937) 1 ARBIT. J. 134.
52. "As the situation is today, there is very little dispute under the standard forms
of contracts except as to the facts..." McGuIRF, MATrERS OF PROCFoURE UNDER Gov-
ERNMENT CONTRACTS (1935) 22.
53. For a discussion of the departmental procedures involving approval by superior
officers, see SHEALEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1938) 311-315. Government agents
have no apparent authority. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389,
409 (1917); Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575 (1921); Filor v. United States, 9
Wall. 45 (U. S. 1869). An exception to the rule is allowed when the United States be-
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nugatory under the Arbitration Act, since only written agreements are en-
forceable under its provisions.54
A workable method of meeting the expenses of an arbitration to which
the Government is a party should not be difficult to find. In general, the
authority of arbitrators is derived from and limited by the arbitration agree-
ment.55 Incident to their authority to make an award, however, they may
have the power to provide compensation for themselves,50 retaining the award
as security,5 7 and to divide the expenses of the arbitration between the
parties.58 Analogizing the expenses of the arbitration to court costs, it would
seem that a Government agency established with a "sue and be sued" clause , '
which might therefore be held liable for costs,G0 would be taxable for its
proper share of the arbitration expenses."' The principle that the United
States as sovereign never pays costs has been modified by the Tucker Act,
which provides that a prevailing claimant in the Court of Claims may have
his costs.62 Assuming that a uniform rule for costs and arbitration expenses
is desirable, its application may be left to the court confirming the award.
The simplest solution for the payment of arbitrators might be to stipulate
in all cases that their compensation be paid by the private contractor, since
this method would require neither specific appropriation for arbitrators nor
authorization to pay them from general funds. An equitable compromise
would be to require each party to pay the fee of the arbitrator it selected.
The arbitrator chosen by the Government could then be drawn from persons
comes a party to commercial paper; it then stands in the shoes of a private person.
United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U. S. 340 (1934).
54. ARBITRATION Acr, § 1. In general, a contract required to be in writing by Rnv.
STAT. §3744 (1875), 41 U. S. C. §16 (Supp. 1939), if not performed, cannot be sued
upon by the contractor. Gruber v. United States, 60 CL CI. 2L (1925) ; Rome Brass &
Copper Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 280 (1925). The government may waive the in-
formality and sue. United States v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co., 239 U. S. S3 (1915).
If, after performance, the government refuses to perfect the contract, the contractor may
sue for the value of his goods or services. Clark v. United States, 95 U. S. 539 (1877);
Moran Bros. v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 486 (1904).
55. See STURGES, COMMERCIAL A-RnBITRATIONS AN.D AW.1;S (1930) 144.
56. Ailing v. 'Munson, 2 Conn. 691 (1818); Strang v. Ferguson, 14 Johns. 161 (N.
Y. 1817); Tri-State Transp. Co. v. Stearns Bros., 195 N. C. 720, 143 S. E. 473 (192-8).
57. Withholding the award beyond the date required for delivery has been held not
to affect its validity. 'Willard v. Bickford, 39 N. H. 536 (1859) ; New York Lumber &
Wood Working Co. v. Schneider, 119 N. Y. 475, 24 N. E. 4 (1890); STurGEs, CuMius-
cIAL ABBITRATIONS AND AwVARDs (1930) 612.
58. See note 56 supra; STURGES, op. cit. szpra note 57, at 611.
59. Forty government-owned corporations have the clause. See Keifer & Keifer v.
RFC, 306 U. S. 381, 390 (1939).
60. RFC v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 111 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. grafltcd,
61 S. Ct. 126 (1940), 8 U. oF CHL L. REv. 154.
61. Cf. United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; United States v. Verdier, 164
U. S. 213, 219 (1896).
62. 24 STAT. 50 (1887), 36 STAT. 1138 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 25S (Supp. 1939).
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already on its payroll. If the arbitrators failed to agree, and appointed a
third arbitrator or umpire, his fee could be paid by the contractor, unless
he, too, were drawn from regular Government personnel. 63 Such an arrange-
ment would eliminate the necessity for further action by Congress, and would
dissuade contractors from invoking arbitration over minor disputes. Depart-
ments contemplating other methods of payment could avoid possible diffi-
culty with the General Accounting Office6 4 by including in their budgetary
requisitions a fund for the compensation of arbitrators.
IV.
Arbitration agreements in Government contracts would be irrevocable and
enforceable in federal courts under the United States Arbitration Act.0 5
They would, however, be subject to the normal requirements of federal juris-
diction.
No difficulty should appear in staying suits brought in violation of an agree-
ment to arbitrate. The United States would bring such a suit in a federal
district court with jurisdiction over the defendant's person. 0 The contractor
could sue the United States on a contract claim only in the Court of Claims,
or, if the matter in controversy were less than $10,000, in the federal district
court. 67 Suit in either case could be stayed on application to the court under
Section 3 of the Arbitration Act.6
8
If, however, either the contractor or the Government, without bringing
suit, refused to proceed to arbitration, a different problem would arise. A
party aggrieved by the other's failure to arbitrate may, under Section 4 of
the Arbitration Act, seek specific performance in any court of the United
States which would have jurisdiction under the Judicial Code of a suit
arising between the parties.6 9 The suits that might arise between the Govern-
ment and a private contractor fall into three jurisdictional categories. The
Court of Claims and the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction of con-
tract suits against the Government where the matter in controversy is less
than $10,000.70 Where it exceeds that figure, the Court of Claims has ex-
63. That one, or even two, of the arbitrators would thus be Government officials would
not appear sufficient to vitiate the arbitration. Cf. Commonwealth v. Union Paving Co.,
288 Pa. 577, 136 At. 856 (1927), and cases there cited. This fact might, however, affect
the arbitration's impartiality, unless the second Government arbitrator were drawn from
another department.
64. See notes 15 and 35 supra.
65. Government agreements would qualify under the Act as agreements in contracts
covering commerce between a state and the District of Columbia, or under the provision
extending the benefits of the Act to commerce within the District. Almnin'ox AcT, § 1.
66. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (Supp. 1939).
67. 36 STAT. 1093 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41(20) (Supp. 1939).
68. ARBITRATION AcT, § 3.
69. ARBITRATION AcT, § 4.
70. 36 STAT. 1093 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41(20) (Supp. 1939).
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clusive jurisdiction.71 Finally, the district courts have jurisdiction of any
suit brought by the Government.7 2 Two interpretations of Section 4 would
be possible. If the Court of Claims is not considered a court of the United
States exercising jurisdiction under the Judicial Code, specific performance
of the agreement to arbitrate could be sought only in the district courts.-a
Presumably they would not be subject to the maximum jurisdictional amnuunt
of $10,000, since the suit would not be one for a money judgment against
the Government. If the Court of Claims is considered a court of the United
States within the meaning of Section 4, it, too, could grant specific per-
formance. As a practical matter, there would seem to be no necessity to
adopt this interpretation. Its only purpose would be to make available a
court which could exercise jurisdiction over Government officers in the
District of Columbia? 4 For this purpose, the District Court of the District
of Columbia would be as satisfactory as the Court of Claims. If the Govern-
ment official failed to appoint an arbitrator, without denying the existence
or applicability of the arbitration agreement, this court under Section 5 of
the Act could itself appoint an arbitrator or arbitratorsY. Proceedings under
either section against a recalcitrant contractor could be had in his own
district.
The Act provides that parties to an agreement may stipulate that judg-
ment be entered on the award and may specify the court to which applica-
tion may be made for such judgment.7 6 Instead of specifying a court in
the agreement, the simpler practice would be to apply to the Court of Claims
to confirm awards of more than $10,000 against the government, to the
district courts or the Court of Claims for smaller awards, and to the district
courts for all awards in favor of the Government. Courts would be required
to confirm the award on application unless it were vacated, modified, or
corrected as the Act prescribes.
77
The Government's rights would be amply protected under the existing
provisions of the Arbitration Act. Motion to vacate would enable the court
to set aside an award if it had been procured by corruption or fraud, if the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, exceeded their powers, or failed to
71. 36 STAT. 1093 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41(20) (Supp. 1939).
72. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (Supp. 1939).
73. For a discussion of jurisdictional requirements under Section 4, see
Co-mmEc A. AsiTRATionS AND AVaMs (1930) 950.
74. In general, it is unwise to proceed against government officers on the assumptiun
that their superiors are not necessary parties. Litigants making the assumption in suits
for injunctions, in order to avoid suing in the District of Columbia, may be met by a
holding that the superior is a necessary party and that the Court has no jurisdiction over
his person, resulting in dismissal of the suit. Gnerich v. Rutter, 265 U. S. 388 (1924);
Eastman v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 807 (W. D. Wash. 1939).
75. ARBITRATION AcT, § 5.
76. ARBITRATION Acr, § 9.
77. ARBITRATION AcT, § 9.
